Introduction
The charismatic populist leader fascinates, mystifies and excites. Populist leaders etch their mark deeply and indelibly on the canvas of national and global history; often colourful and flamboyant, they are successful at forging a bond with their followers that rarely fails to include moral or religious overtones. Populist leaders affirm to be speaking for and with the people; beyond mere representation, they claim to personify the people and to be prepared to faithfully follow something relatively similar to what * E-mail: d.dipiramo@griffith.edu.au Rousseau referred to as the 'general will'. 1 Above all, any type of personalistic leadership is problematic for democracies, which in the most normative sense include the fundamental notion of sovereignty of the people to whom the government is accountable, equal and free elections and a range of civil liberties and political rights. Beyond the commonality provided by these elements conceptions of democracy diverge widely and so does their view of leadership. Those who believe in representational forms of democracy are faced with the constant dilemma that populist or charismatic leadership
In the midst of this tumultuous identification and bonding process, institutional boundaries and conventions are often disregarded, if not derided, in favour of unmediated contact with their citizens. The power that such leaders are bestowed with is controversial for scholars of contemporary politics, for a number of reasons. It tends to offend those amongst us who, as good egalitarians, disapprove of power inequalities or imbalances; it upsets the conservatives, for whom power should be treasured but not flaunted; and communitarians are, of course, alarmed by the apparent triumph of any form of rampant individualism. Finally, those who have a religious disposition are dismayed by the claims of some of these charismatic leaders that their great historic mission is entrusted to them by either a god or inevitable destiny for the good of humanity.
2 solicits when present this context: democracy as a political process implies the underlying and continuous consent of the governed, hence while these democratic leaders are given considerable power by the electorate, they are also meant to be constricted in a number of ways, institutionally and even ethically, in order to be accountable to the people who, in theory, have sovereignty. However, as Urbinati notes, for Rousseau reason unifies the citizens rather than a demagogue, therefore it is 'obedience to public reason that makes for political autonomy, to submit to the will of a demagogue would mean the people become slave'. See Nadia Urbinati, 'Democracy and Populism', Constellations 5, no. 1 (March 1998): 121-122.
the attention and resources of the media, so that the latter concentrates disproportionately on these individuals rather than on the democratic process or on scrutinising the actions of the government.
The situation becomes even more troublesome in democratic formulations that, disillusioned with and hence critical of the representative path, attempt to challenge vertical organisational forms deemed 'insufficiently democratic', seeking to replace them with allegedly more egalitarian and flexible structures. The aim of these horizontal forms is to encourage grassroots participation rather than reliance on individuals or elites so that the people would have more control over political outcomes. Robinson and Tormey explain what is being proposed: 'Instead of seeing plurality and even incommensurability as a threat to the political coherence of the new movements, we should see it as an opening, a possibility for a new kind of politics which not only challenges the oppressive logic of the existing social system, but which also challenges the "necessity" of any system of domination '. 4 There is, to be sure, significant discordance between the representational and the radical strands of democracy, a discordance that is interesting on two accounts. Too often when discussing democracy there is a tendency to treat the tenets fundamental to the liberal representative kind as valid for all the other types. This approach is clearly misleading as there are crucial differences in terms of ideals and priorities that in turn would have significant impact on any discussion of democracy in relation to populism. Going back to the discordance, interestingly it accentuates the direct or participatory model as the more fragile of the two, with regard to the underlying assumptions that it is predicated upon. While the representative system relies on a limited number of individuals to act as trustee-style representatives of the people and does not demand constant input and engagement by the latter, the direct/participatory model assumes that the people are not only able and willing to contribute to the public Under these circumstances, the presence of populist and/or charismatic leaders becomes completely antithetical, despite the fact that such leaders often argue that they are more democratic than their non-populist counterparts, precisely because they bypass inept institutions in favour of a more direct link to the citizens, whom they claim to embody rather than represent. sphere but also to do so in an egalitarian fashion that shuns any possible contest for power. 5 Political action, according to this view, should come from below and should not require constant guidance from an individual political figure or from a vanguard elite group dictating from above; at the most, if there has to be representation, it should be delivered via a delegate rather than a trustee. There should be, radical democrats tell us, no vertical hierarchies that perpetuate hegemonic structures; or homogenous entities that impose one identity for all. Evidently, in this scheme any concept of 'the people' as a unified entity that does not admit diversity is heresy.
Instead, radical democrats insist, there are many voices, none of which is more important than others and therefore none of which should speak on behalf of all. The outcome would be, as expressed by Marcos, a 'world in which there is room for many worlds '. 6 In this paper I argue that populist forms of leadership and vertical modes of political organisation are indispensable to political action and furthermore, that they can be effective catalysts of political innovation. Extending this argument, I wish to make some observations about radical democracies by contending that their premises (upon which their critiques of populist leadership or indeed any type of personalistic leadership are predicated) are not tenable. That is, underlying their contestation of notions of representation and popular sovereignty is the clear assumption that 'the people' are able and willing to politically organise and lead themselves. Even if that was the case, if the people were willing and able to politically organise and lead themselves, would they renounce the temptation to universalise their political message and the race for political control? And if the answer to these questions was positive, would the resulting 'politics of critical reflection' be conducive to effective and practical outcomes?
By this I do not mean that civil society is doomed to perpetual political apathy, on the contrary, revolutionary ideas, activities and discourses are never confined to selected socio-political spaces. What I am saying is that political activity or change requires leadership (sometimes of the populist flavour) and a degree of vertical or hierarchical organisation, at least at some stages of the process. Also, it is necessary to combine critical reflection with political action, which inevitably means challenging 5 I will refer to participatory, deliberative and direct forms of democracy as 'radical democracy' for the sake of brevity. In broad terms and using populism as a vehicle, this paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the nature of authority and whether the will of the people is best served by institutions or by individuals. There can be no denying that leadership and democracy are crucial issues at the present time. This has been clearly reconfirmed by the role that charismatic and redemptive leadership has played in the American election, whilst the disintegration of the global financial market clearly points to the inadequacies of the free market and possibly also those of representative democracy. exclusively) as the result of the influence this leader has on them (rather than on its own merits). It is also true that populist programs are amenable to radical change (Peronism under Menem is a good example), but we must not forget that even liberalism is not exactly a consistent or homogenous body of political thought.
Romancing the Masses: the Populist Phenomenon in Latin America
Nevertheless, the most reasonable avenue in terms of ideology (defined as above) is to refer to populism as a 'thin-centred ideology', something that whilst reasonable, is not particularly useful when seeking conceptual clarity.
The meaning of 'ideology' acquires more depth in Laclau's work. In this context, populism is conceived as an alternative discourse that arises in response to the crisis of the dominant ideological discourse as the latter becomes increasingly discordant with and unresponsive to the surrounding socio-political conditions. This idea links discourse to power relations and places leadership in a pivotal position, since populism is the inclusion of the people in a leader's synthetic-antagonistic discourse 'which seeks to confront the power bloc as a whole, in order to assert its hegemony'. 44 For Laclau, political discourse is the means to the construction of a political subject and, subsequently, political identity and consciousness. Populist agendas. The dichotomy of 'pueblo versus oligarchy' is often radicalised to 'good versus evil' resulting in a moral crusade with strong religious overtones, yet one that offers little faith in the likelihood of negotiation with the opposition.
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The anti-establishment, anti-elitist and nationalistic nature of populist discourse not only articulates a critique of a system that is in crisis or even in a state of moral panic, but also promises social regeneration, political integrity and egalitarian justice as solutions to inadequate political practices; all this under the auspices of a devoted, messianic and innovative leader, who will, above all, offer hope and dignity to the masses. De la Torre, discussing the discursive strategy of populism that transforms political struggle into a struggle for higher moral values concludes that 'populist discourse and rhetoric radicalize the emotional element common to all political discourses'. 47 Most importantly, as Taggart notes, at the heart of populist discourse lies the idea of a singular but universal version of political truth.
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Whether these ideas of collective identity and inclusion are or whether they ever do What is important is whether the people perceive themselves as participants included in the political spectacle rather than mere spectators; after all, if this perception is real to the people concerned it matters little whether it is an objective reality. 
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Menem is the other obvious example. This leader cleverly used Peronist symbolism and language to gain support by association and to maintain his popularity. In spite of his adoption of a macro-economic model that was to deepen rather than ameliorate inequalities, he was able to 'divide and conquer' the labour movement in Argentina by selecting cooperative unions and by preventing the emergence of a unified labour opposition.
necessary institutional support (for instance, from the military) and achieve a certain level of economic stability.
Nevertheless, and this is a point that Raby draws our attention to, neo-liberalism was never really an ideology adopted with great enthusiasm by most Latin American countries.
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Examples of contemporary populist leadership suggest that these individuals, Yet the question of whether Lula, who has been called a 'democratic socialist' by some and a follower of neo-liberalism by others, is a populist (in the strict sense of the word) is contentious. 69 Conceptualisations of populism are made even more difficult by the fact that it often exists in a democratic context, albeit one that is often more procedural than substantive. In a sense, just as in the case of neo-liberalism, populist/charismatic leadership can serve to 'oil the wheels', so to speak, of the democratic process. In another sense, the shortcomings of representative democracy pave the way for the rise of populist leaders, particularly when whole sections of the population are not adequately represented by institutions or when the dominant ideological discourse
In this regard, I would suggest that neither socialist nor neoliberal credentials preclude populism. The elements that do 'disqualify' a leader from the populist label are respect for institutions, acceptance of pluralism and willingness to negotiate with the opposition; their presence in Lula's leadership does mean that we need to consider the possibility of a populist spectrum rather than extreme and rigid categories.
ceases to be relevant for substantial portions of the population, as Laclau argues.
What holds true for all the different guises that populist leadership may take is that access to the political system is often gained in times of change or crisis, for these leaders are an expedient and transient political solution, able to either mobilise or appease the people. Once in power, they transform the political system to varying degrees and, if charismatic, become cult figures who inspire the masses.
Nevertheless, even at the best of times the spectre of authoritarianism remains a present and constant danger in populist regimes. This is particularly the case in Crabtree observes that the tension between autocratic and democratic elements could never properly be reconciled in populism. Conniff, on the other hand, argues that populism can be non-authoritarian or can at least be considered semi-democratic, in that it descends from a communal tradition and it does fulfil at least one of the requirements of democracy: the extension of political inclusion to the masses. Several other academics characterize populism as 'ambiguous' in this regard. 70 their counterparts who practice democracy through the mediation of the institutional system.
The main reason for this ambiguity is that populist leaders claim to be more democratic than Unsurprisingly, the debate surrounding the interconnection between populism and democracy has continued unabated, although democracy seems to emerge as the more 'bruised' concept of the two. 71 As Mény and Surel state, '[populism]…cannot be described as anti-democratic per se' and, they point out, the claims of populists are well-founded since in democracy the principle of representation and direct modes of popular expression are not balanced. Papadopoulus similarly argues that the populist principle is consubstantial with democracy. 72 But to debate whether populism is democratic or not is indeed to miss the point, for the complexities of the debate derive mostly from the diverse and incompatible definitions of democracy rather than from populism itself. As Canovan sagaciously pointed out with her redemptive/pragmatic model, the ambiguities of populism are more a reflection of democracy's own inherent tensions and contradictions than a problem peculiar to populism itself. own particularity. Going further, the author states that 'political leadership is constitutive and necessary in the sense that, without some political leadershipwithout someone representing and articulating the collective identity, which does not emerge of its own-there would be no collective agency to counter the persons and institutions that currently rule the world'.
78
But if the normative notion of representation is repudiated by radical democrats, the populist idea of empathetic representation is downright abhorrent to them, as it is considered a straight route to vertical (hence oppressive) organisational forms.
Radical democrats wish for more than a set of abstract procedures and civil-political rights: they wish to curb the oppressive influence of the majority over minorities.
Hence we understand radical democracy to be about the freedom of the 'peoples' to shape their political destiny and their autonomy to speak for themselves at all times in terms of the particular rather than the universal. Liberal representative democracy allows minorities to dissent, but it does not (indeed, it cannot) guarantee the triumph of the particular over the universal. Populism, more offensively, is about the appropriation of the people's will by the leader and the representation of that will as a 'homogeneous moral-ethical datum that does not admit differences'.
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The democratic claim of popular sovereignty or the 'will of the people' deserves further attention, given that it is problematic in the radical scheme for it implies unity and singularity. It might be true that the 'will of the people has to be a mediated and ongoing construction which necessarily escapes final determination', but as Abts and Rummens admit, even in the radical variant popular sovereignty needs to be unified-indiversity. 80 And, as Panizza points out, if 'the people' is a contested entity, then the will of the people and popular sovereignty are also provisional concepts that cannot appropriate the locus of power Lefort refers to as the 'empty place' indefinitely. 81 Furthermore, the concept of popular sovereignty is problematic for radical democracies because they reject universalism in favour of the political coexistence of particularities. In this case, 'will of the people' translates to 'wills of the peoples', but as Laclau has most persuasively argued, 'no particularity can become political without becoming the locus of universalising effects'.
What logically follows is that if the non-certainty or the temporary nature of power is what defines democracy, then democracy is not about popular sovereignty at all, but about the possibility and the opportunity of filling the vacuum on transitory basis rather than about the certainty of the people's will being enacted. Once any particularity takes this position, it is 'doomed' to become a hegemonising force or 'hegemonic terrain' or, at least, it is compelled to enter the contest for hegemony against other particularities in the universal, the empty arena where the struggles that give it its temporary content are played out. In other words, populist
and charismatic forms of leadership should be transient rather than long-term presences in the political system. There are various reasons for this, including the frequent inability of these leaders to respond to changes in objective conditions once they are in power as well as the fact that no individual can represent the will of the people over a prolonged period of time, nor should they seek to do so, not least because the popular will is not a fixed formation. The other side of the coin is that to the radical democrat, the ability and the willingness of the people to lead themselves and each other is a given fact, an assumption that is rarely questioned. History does not in practice support these premises, for horizontal forms of political organisations have not been prevalent in nation-states. Similarly, political philosophy from Aristotle and Plato to Freud and le Bon has not placed much faith in the ability of 'the masses' to do without individual leadership. Moreover, there is substantial evidence of the pivotal role played by specific individuals who, at crucial historical moments, have been able to invigorate the people and trigger political change. Various scholars take this position. Mudde, for instance, argues that 'The current heartland of the populists does support democracy, but they do not want to be bothered with politics all the time….True, they want to be heard in the case of fundamental decisions, but first and foremost they want leadership. They want politicians who know (rather than 'listen to') the people, and who make their wishes come true'. 89 Furthermore, as Raby points out, the relationship between masses and leader is dialectical: 'the leader cannot take the people where they do not want to go and he cannot operate outside possibilities that were already part of the existing social structure and cultural heritage of the original movement'. 90 If we may make the leap from populist to charismatic leadership, this dialectic echoes a central element of Weber's analysis of charismatic authority: the charismatic leader has to be recognised by his followers in order to achieve any degree of legitimacy.
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As Thomassen has stated, the trouble with the post-representational position is that it is 'vain' and therefore potentially dangerous because it overlooks the role of political and intellectual leadership in formulating who we or others really are. claim, is showing the way, even if he is 'creating political space' rather than imposing a precise project with regards to how this space should be used. 93 Nevertheless, he is a cult figure, the white charismatic spokesperson of an Indigenous movement that professes to subscribe to and practice horizontal politics. Understandably, his role is not just ambiguous, it is downright controversial. Elsewhere, I have noted that Marcos continuously treads the fine line between personalism and the effort to 'democratise' his own charismatic authority. 94 His attempts to avoid the stigmas of 'Latin America caudillo' and 'Marxist vanguard' are evident in several of his statements. 95 The creation of a masked and hence 'faceless' public personage is the antidote to The Other Campaign, for instance, was still extremely vague with regard to any political direction. Marcos states:
…fundamentally, it will be the people from the bottom that will be able to take charge of it, organising themselves another way. The old recipes or the old parameters should serve as a reference of what was done, but not as something that should be re-adopted to do something new. 98 That 'something new' was not specified. A couple of communiqués issued in February and in May 2006 are particularly interesting, in that Marcos does admit that rebellion alone achieves nothing and that they (the Zapatistas) and civil society need to organise themselves. 99 These observations do not mean one should give up the idea of a vigorous civil society, of autonomous thought, of the flight from the universal or even the hope of a world where power as it has been conceived throughout history will be redefined as something other than relations of domination, something like the Zapatistas' concept of 'leading by obeying'. Nevertheless, we need to acknowledge that vertical politics will more than likely always be politically expedient. After all, populist charismatic leaders begin as inspired agents of change, with political programs that are responsive to the conditions of society at that particular time. In other words, they are, in a sense, the creation of the people. 100 We also need to acknowledge that only a portion of civil society is sufficiently altruistic and willing to take the challenge and in many ways, what is the burden of political action. And those who do want to do so may well wish to change the world the old fashioned way, that is, by unapologetically taking power.
